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A. major problem with present fleet tactical computer programs
La the failures that occur because of software faults caused by inter-
mittent transient errors. Presented are measures that should be
taken to prevent the generation of these transients, and possible steps
for the detection and the correction of faults caused by these transients
Examples are drawn from the practices used in the SAFEGUARD,
AEGIS, and STAR computer system programs. The paper describes
some of the causes of program degradation and requirements for
future activities to overcome these problems. Some specific examples
are shown to illustrate corrective measures that could be taken. The





II. FAULT TOLERANT HARDWARE 8
UL MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT OF SOFTWARE 21
IV. FAULT-FREK RELIABLE PROGRAMS 26
V.. FAULT DETECTION AND CORRECTION IN COMPUTER
PROGRAMS.. 36
VI. CONCLUSIONS 48
LIST OF REFERENCES 52
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 54
FORM DD 1473 55

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Navy has now embarked on a program that
will soon see all major tactical and support systems driven, controlled,
and maintained by digital computers or by information provided by
digital computers. To insure that these systems will be used as they
are designed, senior personnel in the key decision making positions
must be given assurance that the system will run properly, and that
the system will indicate to the operator when it is not performing
properly so that corrective steps can be taken to restore the system
to its correct operating level.
There are two classes of computer system faults that can cause
degradation, and either will lead to failure if the minor faults are not
periodically or continuously corrected. They are the hardware com-
ponents and the software programs of the computer system. The
first of these areas (hardware) is currently attracting the most
attention, and is the one in which the most progress is being made.
The software segment is the least talked about, but to the Navy it is
equally important. While in many computer system operations the
failure of the software can cause a loss of time, or slowdown in
production, the loss of a tactical program when it is needed will
result in the loss of. the ship and whatever it is defending. The
problems of computer software failure are widespread and apply

equally to the batch processing of user programs and to the real-time
and time shared environment of tactical modules. In the chapters to
follow several possible causes of program failures will be described.
The effects of protection systems now in use will be identified and
possible additional approaches will be outlined. Evidence of the
problem in today's tactical environment is based on information
received from officers and agencies associated with the Navy Tactical
Data System (NTDS), as well as trouble reports generated about this
system. The reports indicate that most of today's failures are occur-
ring in the computer software segment of the system. Since the-
problem is usually thought to be caused by a specific function either
using an un-debugged path or becoming erratic in its operation. The
cure used is to reload the computer programs and restart, without
gathering data on why the failure actually occurred.
The research process involved talks with Raytheon, Computer
Science Corporation (CSC), and RCA programmers writing the
operational program modules for the AEGIS Weapon System; with
UNIVAC engineers and programmers who are working on the
AN-UYK/7 computer and CMS-2 compiler; with field engineers from
IBM; and visits to the NTDS Test Site at Mare Island and the Fleet
Computer Programming Center, Pacific in San Diego. In addition
Bell Laboratories in Madison, New Jersey provided information on
the steps that they are taking to make the ABM system programs
fault tolerant.

The method of attack that is used in the development of software
reliability is similar to that used by hardware designers in that the
first step taken is to insure that the initial program is designed
correctly, put together correctly, and will run fault free if no external
stimuli are introduced to the module.
Chapter II describes the present state-of-the-art techniques
being used in the design of fault tolerant computer hardware. An
example ( JPL STAR Computer) of the techniques is given to provide
a background of redundancy methods that can be applied to computer
software. In Chapter III, monitoring and measurement of computer
software performance is described. Information for detecting and
correcting faults in programs will be gathered by using suitable
combinations of these techniques. Methods of organizing and checking
out computer programs to insure that they are fault free are described
in Chapter IV. A summary of program proving by techniques other
than executing with test cases is given and the type of checkout being
used in state-of-the-art development is illustrated (SAFEGUARD
Computer Programs). Chapter V describes the methods of fault
detection that are available, presents new areas for consideration
and delineates their applicability to Navy computer systems. The
need for the use of redundancy techniques for computer programs is
shown. A summary of what has been accomplished and directions
for future work is given in Chapter VI.

When the research for the thesis showed that the ground to be
covered was larger than anticipated, a specific endpoint for this
development was selected. The paper presents the work I have done
in establishing some of the causes for program degradation, and
establishing direction for future activity to overcome these problems,
Some specific examples are shown to illustrate some corrective
measures that could be taken. The applicability of protective redun-
dancy to computer programs is established.

II. FAULT TOLERANT HARDWARE
The inclusion of fault tolerance in the design of a computer would
be unnecessary if it were possible to build a computer that was in
complete agreement with the designer's intentions and would never
wear out. Since this is not possible, the best that can be done is to
consider fault tolerance in the initial stages of the design, when it is
cheapest and easiest to implement, and allow it to be an inherent part
of the computer.
There are three major sources of trouble that must be considered
when designing and building a fault free or fault tolerant computer.
These are initial design and wiring errors, hardware faults, and
transient faults [Ref. 9].
The design and wiring errors exist in the hardwired program in
the computer and in its mechanical connections. The validation and
detection problem for this trouble is relatively simple as the errors
generated are wide spread and easy to spot. In the hardwired pro-
grams, the algorithms implemented are usually of limited complexity
and easy to follow. The mechanical connection errors are detected
by logic diagnosis and testing techniques that have become widespread
in circuit construction testing where backplane wiring and integrated
circuitry are used. The hardest errors to detect in this class are

those where an incorrect result is obtained only for an infrequently-
occurring set of data, or if the fault is localized.
As defined by Avizienis [Ref. 6], hardware faults come in two
categories. Hard failures are those which are permanent. In this
case the element involved fails and continues to give either a "stuck
at 0" or a "stuck at 1" output. It is also possible for this type of
"stuck" failure to give both "1" and "0" outputs, but always at the
wrong time. This failure usually occurs during burn-in or after
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component wearout has started. An intermittent fault is one that
occurs for a certain set of inputs only, and causes the same type of
"stuck" outputs as the hard failures. In both hard and intermittent
component failures, the immediate symptom is a logic fault in the
operation of the computer. That is, the current instruction will not
be executed correctly or an incorrect result will be computed.
The transient fault is the third of the basic problem classes.
This fault will be caused by the temporary incorrect operation of a
component, or, more commonly, because of external interference
with the computer. Such interference can be caused by irregularities
in power supplies, electro-magnetic radiation hazards, environmental
Burn-in. The operation of items prior to their ultimate
application intended to stabilize their characteristics and identify
early failures.
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Wearout. A failure that occurs near the end of the operability
curve due to the deterioration process.

shocks, and similar events. This is the type of fault that tends to go
undetected and uncorrected. There is usually no record of the failure
having occurred and periodic checkout of the computer will not indicate
that anything is wrong.
All of the types of failures described have one of two effects on
the computer system. The fault may be independent -- affecting only
the component or logic circuit it is in, or the fault may be catastrophic
causing the entire computer system to fail. Much work is being done
in computer design to combat these failures and to achieve a high
degree of fault tolerance. The computer designer is increasing his
use of the theory and practices of protective redundancy. This thesis
begins to apply to computer program design and automatic repair the
theory of protective redundancy that is being applied to hardware.
Protective redundancy consists of all additional programs,
additional circuits and repetitions of operations that would not be
needed in a perfect computer. The elements of protective redundancy
must be applied in order to effect recovery. Throughout, "complete
recovery" will be used to mean the continuation of system operation
without loss of data [Ref. 8]. There are different degrees of recovery
dependent upon the amount of protective redundancy that is used. The
degrees are: 1). complete -the level of operation is unchanged;
2) restart -the level of operation is the same but the system picks up
at a different point of operation, the program is "rolledback" to the
last successful operation; 3) degraded-the computer continues running,
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but with limited capabilities and perhaps at a different program
location; 4) terminated-the computer has saved as much information
as possible, has notified the operator of the failure, but is unable to
continue program execution. The degree of recovery possible is
dependent upon the severity of the fault and upon the amount of
redundancy used. The amount of redundancy is limited by the amount
of money, size, weight, and time that is available during development,
and by the time that is available during computer operation for running
redundancy programs. The redundancy in the system must be designed
in to be purposeful and useful rather than accidental.
In hardware terms there are two types of redundancy that are
most common: static-where the redundant units are always powered
and connected; dynamic -where the standby unit is switched into the
system and the failed unit switched out when the fault is detected.
The two methods will be described in the following paragraphs, a
comparison of the reliabilities obtainable will be shown, and the
state-of-the-art will be exemplified by a description of the JPL STAR
Computer (Jet Propulsion Laboratory Self-Testing and Repairing).
Concurrent with the design of computers, redundancy techniques
have also been developed [Ref. 10]. Static or masking redundancy is
the terminology applied to those methods that involve encoding of the
function, active performance of all components of the system, and
implicit recognition of the error. Using these techniques, the
presence of a faulty element is immediately covered up by its
11

replacement element which has been permanently connected and con-
currently running in the system. The static technique allows for
replication from the component level to the system level. Triple
modular redundancy (TMR) as defined by J. von Neumann [Ref. 18]
provides for the availability of voting at selected interfaces, with
the faulty elements being dropped from the system until repaired.
The advantages of the static approach are:
1) The corrective action is hardwired into the system and
is thus immediate. This is particularly important if
there is a high ratio of hard failures to transient errors.
2) During system operation there is no need to devote
computer time to the running of fault diagnosis
programs.
3) If the computer was not initially designed with useful
redundancy, the conversion to static redundancy is
straightforward and simple.
Dynamic or standby redundancy makes use of functionally identical
units. In this organization, only the modules actually in use are
"powered up". The recognition of failures in the dynamic method is
usually explicit. Since the switching in of the spare unit must be
automatic if the computer is to be self-repairing, two principal
Voting. The comparison of the output of three or more units
with majority rule and minority failure indicated.
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methods of automatic response are used: 1) replacement of the faulty-
element by using one of the standby spares; 2) reconfiguration of the
system into one that can still operate, but in a degraded mode. In
both techniques, a diagnostic program must be present, and in
addition the second method also requires the presence of a recon-
figuration program. Error correction is accomplished by recom-
-
putation from the failed point or by program rollback .
The advantages of the dynamic redundancy techniques are
[Ref. 6]:
1) Power is required for only one copy of each replaceable
module required for the system, and the unpowered
copies have inherently lower failure rates than the
powered copies.
2) Fault isolation between subsystems is provided by the
replacement switch, which prevents the spread of
possible catastrophic failures.
3) All spares can be utilized where required, unlike the
static case which can use each spare only where it is
wired into the system.
4) The design of the individual replaceable components
can be modified or improved, and the number of
Program rollback. Returning by monitor system control, to the
last point in the executive program that was executed correctly and
continuing operation from that point.
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spares increased or decreased to meet the needs of
a given mission without changing the system design.
5) There is no need to increase the fan- in/ fan -out
requirements of the components as is often the
case for logic elements used in static redundancy.
6) Pre-mission checkout is easier as not all of the
replicated units are connected to the system and
can be individually tested by use of diagnostic
programs as opposed to the static case.
7) The need for synchronization required by static TMR
techniques is not required using the dynamic system.
8) Dynamic redundancy has the ability to correct errors
caused by transient faults by the use of program
rollback.
The present "best approach" to the fault tolerant design problem
is to use the advantages of both of these methods wherever possible.
Since the dynamic techniques give a greater improvement in reli-
ability than the static techniques [Ref. 2], more of the dynamic methods
are being used in present systems.
TMR is used with "back-up dynamic sparing" in sections where
faults must be corrected on an instantaneous basis. Even with this
The voting technique is used, with the units involved in the
voting replaced using the dynamic technique of powering a standby
unit when it is needed.
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voting replacement, the possibility of a transient fault is allow
for in the subsequent automatic checkout and return to spare status
of the suspect unit.
JPL STAR COMPUTER
The most advanced of the fault tolerant computers is the JPL. STAR
Computer being developed at JPL at the California Institute of Tech-
nology [Ref. 2], It makes use of a hybrid of the static and dynamic
techniques. A block diagram (Fig. 1) of the STAR Computer shows
the basic organization of the computer, while Table 1 describes the
function of the modules shown in the block diagram. With the exception
of the Test and Repair Processor (TARP), only one copy of each
module is powered at a time. The TARP is the hybrid component,
operating with basic TMR and standby sparing. The TARP controls
synchronization in order to initiate recovery; otherwise the modules
operate autonomously. The TARP is continuously informed as to
how each of the powered units is operating. During normal operations
the TARP is a monitor, and the stored programs are executed. The
TARP has facilities to store "most recent" correctly executed proc-
esses so that it is able to perform rollback and restart after an error
has been detected.
The TARP is the monitor in the STAR Computer and it controls
the recovery mode. The TARP consists of a control and test segment
























COP Control processor, contains the location counter and
index registers and performs modifications of
instruction addresses before execution.
LOP Logic processor, performs logical operations on data
words (two copies are powered).
MAP Main arithmetic processor, performs arithmetic
operations on data words.
ROM READ-ONLY memory, 16, 384 permanently stored
words.
RWM READ-WRITE memory unit with 4096 words of storage
(at least two units powered; 12 units are directly
addressable, maximum 49, 152 words).
IOP Input/output processor, contains I/O buffer registers.
IRP Interrupt processor, handles interrupt requests.
TARP Test and repair processor, monitors the operation of
the computer and implements recovery (three copies
powered).
STAR COMPUTER MODULE DESCRIPTION
TABLE 1 [Ref. 2]
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standard mode control logic and prediction logic which predicts
what the status symbols from the operational units should be. It
performs fault detection, fault location, stops the computer and
transfers control to the REC segment. The REC contains the "rollback
point" address register for the resumption of operation after recovery.
Upon receipt of an error message from the CAT segment, the REC
segment orders the functional units to reset and attempts execution
from the "rollback point". A repeated error results in the REC
segment ordering the failed unit to be replaced by one of the standby
spares.
Table 2 compares the reliability predicted for the STAR computer
compared with that obtained by the Mariner Mars 1969 computer
(MM 69) and a simplex computer of equivalent performance [Ref. 2].
The "K" in the table is the ratio of failures in powered units to failures
in unpowered units. K = co means no failures in unpowered units,
K = 1 means there is an equal failure rate between powered and un-
powered units. Table 3 shows the comparison of the amount of time
each computer would be able to perform and still meet a specific
mission reliability. As can be readily seen, the STAR is an order
of magnitude or more better than the simplex computer, and 3-4
times better than MM 69 that made use of static redundancy techniques.
Work is still being continued with the STAR Computer, with each
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87 360
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TABLE 2 [Ref. 2]
Mission Duration in Years
Desired STAR Computer with S Spares
Mission MM*69 Simplex Upper Bound Lower Bound
Reliability Computer Computer S = 3 S = 2 S = 3 S = 2
0.9 0.7 0. 3 12.5 7.5 6.7 4.5
0. 8 1.5 0.6 16.0 9.7 8.5 6.0
0.7 2.4 0.9 18.5 11.7 10.0 7.
0.6 3.5 1.3 20.5 13.5 11. 3 8. 3
MISSION DURATION VERSUS REQUIRED RELIABILITY
TABLE 3 [Ref. 2]
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The biggest step that had to be taken came with the realization
that the improvements that were being made in the hardware fault
tolerance were placing requirements on the design of the computer
programs to support these advances.
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III. MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT OF SOFTWARE
The development of any fault tolerant system requires the designer
to be able to measure and monitor the performance of the modules he
has developed. All along the development path he is faced with the
trade-offs between cost, size, speed and capabilities of the observing
programs as opposed to the functional programs.
Monitors and measurers of software can take the form of hardware
equipment or software programs, and each has its advantages. In either
case, they should be designed into the system they are to be used with,
rather than added on as an afterthought. Measurement and the use of
the results obtained must be carefully evaluated to keep from reaching
erroneous conclusions about the system being observed. As real-time
systems increase in size and in complexity, the requirement grows for
monitors that will enable the operator to find errors and allow the
designer to correct the errors. In the past systems have been designed
and only after failing to operate as anticipated, have they been subjected
to monitoring and performance measurement.
To be a useful tool, measurement and evaluation must take place
continuously throughout the lifetime of an operating system. The proper
testpoints, both hardware and software, must be added to the system
as time demonstrates their need [Ref. 3]. The system evaluator should
be given the system designer, because in most cases, he is the only
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one with sufficient knowledge of the system to properly place the
measurement points and to evaluate the data that is gathered from the
points.
There are three software techniques that are used for. system
measurement [Ref. 7]. They are simulation models, analytic models
and internal system measurement. Simulation has the disadvantage
that the data for the simulation must be obtained from some source.
If it is obtained from the system to be simulated, then the designer,
in many cases, will prefer to work with the actual system rather than
the simulation. Since the simulation is not usually written by the
system designer, he may again not want to use it, suspecting that it is
not as current as the system is. In the case where the simulation is
used to predict system performance before the system has become
operational, data must be gathered from similar systems, and the
confidence level of the evaluator again is not very high. As evaluators
become more experienced in the use of simulations, and are able to
decide what data is useable and what is not, the value of reports
received from simulations is increasing. The important conclusion
to be drawn about the simulation technique is that the simulation must
be kept simple and must be developed early enough so that it can be
kept current with its operational system.
The use of analytical techniques has not yet reached the state of
development where their use can be widespread. Making use of
simplifying assumptions, average values, etc., the models' primary
22

•usefulness appear to be in the study of gross system effects. Analytical
techniques have not yet begun to achieve the type of success reported
by the simulation methods [Ref. 3].. Their use is still limited to the
few people who understand the mathematics behind the method, and
the proper simplifying assumptions that must be made.
Internal system measurement is the technique that is most widely
used, though the evaluation of the data obtained is still very difficult.
The three types of internal measurements are event counting, trace
recording, and sample taking [Ref.. 7]. These methods all try to
answer the question of where did the time go that is not accounted for
by proper system operation. The important point that must be remem-
bered when evaluating the data is to use no preconceived ideas to place
the lost time. Every system is different and few generalities can be
drawn.
Event counting involves the incrementing of a counter each time a
specific event is started. This method enables the experienced eval-
uator to determine if an event is occurring more often than it should,
and thus reset some of the program parameters. There is no tie to
either time or to sequences of events using this method, but it is the
simplest of all techniques, taking very little processor time.
Event tracing is the next step in complexity from event counting.
In this technique, each time an event is started, its name and the time
that it starts, plus any additional desired information, such as user,
23

is also recorded. The trace provides information on job paths, queues,
time, and time between events. Care must be taken to keep the methods
uniform so that different traces can be compared to determine if system
changes are improving or deteriorating the system. Much success has
been obtained using these techniques.
The sampling technique involves entering the system at random
intervals and recording all queue, register, and device status informa-
tion that is desired. This technique is able to gather information both
on the operating system and on user programs. Care must be taken to
insure that the sampling is done in a random manner to avoid syn-
chronization with the running programs that might tend to invalidate
the data being gathered. Data reduction programs are generally used
to analyze the data that is obtained.
It must be emphasized that the data gathered by any of the above
techniques must be examined very carefully. It is easy to draw im-
proper conclusions from looking at the data obtained and make changes
to the operating system that will do more harm than good. In addition
to these software techniques, hardware devices can be directly coupled
to the computer system to record data that can be used in performance
analysis.
Devices such as the IBM SPAR (systems performance activity
recorder) can be coupled by probes to measure the logic pulses or
levels at the points of interest of the system [Ref. 7]. Care must be
taken when introducing additional hardware to keep from adding to the
24

system load. When properly used, the hardware measurement tech-
nique offers three major advantages over the previously mentioned
software techniques:
L) Effectively creates no system interference.
Z) Allows very fine measurements at the microsecond or
smaller level, and obtains utilization percentages.
1) Allows access to all parts of the system.
All of the techniques mentioned turn out to be performance
measurers and system monitors. These are the predominant methods
that are being used in large computer complexes today. There are no
clearly defined approaches to the monitoring of and the correction of
system errors unless they are the error types that generate interrupts
The methods described must be extended before they become useful to
a system operator in a realtime environment.
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IV. FAULT- FREE RELIABLE PROGRAMS
When writing a large program, proper organizational and program,
ming techniques must be used to obtain a program that is both fault-
free and reliable., The first consideration is organization to avoid the
generation of errors while producing a program [Ref. 12].
The development process is plagued with many problems that must
be considered when organizing to produce a large system program.
Unless proper documentation and validation techniques are followed,
the resulting system will prove to be unmaintainable and useless. The
primary areas of concern are [Ref. 12]:
1) Programmer turnover- -throughout the development period
of a large operating system, it can be anticipated that
programmer turnover will average about 20% per year.
2) Hardware turnover- -since the software is usually placed
into development after the hardware is in existence, there
is a requirement to modify the software as it is being written
to account for changes that are being made in the hardware.
3) Software turnover- -during the development of the system
it is likely that new ideas and developments will require
the system to be modified as it is being written.
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4) Inexperienced programmers - -aside from the actual designers,
the group programmers will be unfamiliar with the system
under development and the desired organization.
5) No single information source— no individual, including the
system designer, is abLe to be totally familiar with the
entire project.
6) Poor communication—between members of the same pro-
gramming group, between groups, and between project
managers.
7) Poor documentation- -an individual will program a segment
and understand what is accomplished, but anyone else will
be unable to determine the operation of that particular module.
These problems must be successfully countered before the prob-
lems of program verification and reliability can be handled. The
basic solution to the problems is to establish a computer program
development plan that determines the approaches that are to be taken
in organization, documentation, verification, and communication.
The development plan will establish the order of the program modules,
the method of review of the modules, and the level at which documenta-
tion is to take place. The document must establish the interfaces
between modules and the time frame of the reviews and reports to
the system managers.
It is the documentation effort that is of primary concern to the
overall system coordinator. With proper documentation he is able to
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get system flowcharts and listings that are understandable and that
can be used in the debugging of the program. He is able to determine
if the desired fault detection capabilities have been included in the
module, and he is able to implement changes and improvements even
in the face of turnover in personnel and equipment. With the solution
of the introductory organizational problems, the system manager is
then able to turn to the problem of program verification and validation.
Here again there are two causes for concern, one relatively simple,
and one that is still extremely difficult.
The first is the assurance that the program has been converted
from thought to flowchart to code to an input medium without the
introduction of mechanical errors. The second is keeping the copy of
the program in the computer correct.
By checking and by human verification it is usually possible to
get the program into the computer and begin the process of program
verification and debugging. Another way of looking at this development
process is to break down the procurement of a software system into
steps, and see how far we have progressed. Some typical steps in this
development are:
1) statement of the problem
2) description of a solution algorithm




4) preparation and transfer of the code onto an input media
5) compilation of the program into binary machine code
6) execution using sample data
7) debugging using sample data and returning to step 3
8) final phase testing using typical data and looping to step 3
as required
9) confident issuing of the program to an operational environment
To this point the first four of these steps have been discussed, and
in most systems they are the easiest to accomplish. It is the sources
of errors in the remaining steps that must be detected and eliminated.
Starting in the compilation phase, it is felt that more of the error
detection should be automated for more completeness. A wider range
of programming checking devices that could uncover improper coding
and input format should be evoked by the compiler. This could include
checks on variable declarations, range of subscripts for arrays, loop
boundaries, etc.
,
in an attempt to catch errors which most compilers
miss and which are hard for the programmer to visibly see on a
printout. In addition, making the compiler responsible for the catch-
ing of errors in program semantics, although complicating the compiler,
would simplify the programmers' problems. The modules under
development, after passing through this type of compiler, would thus




The normal progression of events would have the software under
development proceed to bulk testing with all types of expected sample
data. In this way the system manager would attempt to prove to his
own satisfaction that steps seven and eight were complete and that the
program could be issued to its operational users. It is obvious from
the results of system packages now being used that this method of
verification is not successful. The programs that are in the fleet
consistently have to be patched in order to fix bugs that were not
uncovered during these test and verification periods. For this reason,
work is being done in the development of automatic program checkout
and verification.
Automatic Program Checkout
There are many approaches being taken in the field of automatic
checkout, and several of these are briefly described below. For more
complete descriptions, the references should be read.
1) Dijkstra and Naur [Ref. 16, 17] advocate a systematic
approach to the writing of the program. Though not mech-
anical, the approach calls for working slowly from the top
down, so that the program is proven to be correct at each
step in its construction. Thus the written program would
be correct and would meet all of its specifications. This
attack would not be applicable to programs already written.
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2) Manna and Waldinger [Ref. 15] use a mechanical theorem
proving technique based on predicate calculus. The theorem
represents the specifications of the program and the calculus
is used to operate on it to prove the program correct. This
mechanical approach is limited by the strength of the theorem
prover and by what can be stated about the program in
theorem format.
3) London [Ref. 13] attempts to take a program that is already
written along with the specifications of what it is supposed
to do, and certify by mathematical proof that the specification
is met in all cases. During the proof, the specification may
have to be altered or changes made to the program if the two
do not match as required.
4) King [Ref. 4] attempts to prove that programs will execute
correctly by establishing an abstract model for computations,
then using predicate calculus to establish the correctness of
the different paths through the program. The method may
fail when not all verification conditions are true; however,
it can be stated that if the program is correct, there exists
some inductive predicates which will yield a proof by this
technique.
In a paper presented by Zlspas, et al, at the 1971 International
Symposium on Fault- Tolerant Computing [Ref. 14], the relative
merits of the different program verification methods are summarized.
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The major difference that this paper draws between the methods is
that for any large program, the hand calculations (1, 3, 4 above)
become excessive in length and can generate their own errors that
cancel out their effectiveness. On the basis of the comparisons and
additional work, several conclusions are drawn and recommendations
made:
1) There is going to be no rapid breakthrough in the
establishment of verification techniques.
2) The use of off-the-shelf routines will improve the
performance and ease of verification of programs.
3) Informal proofs will currently be more effective than
using theorem provers until such time as the theorem
provers become more suitable for computer use.
4) It is likely that any mechanical verification procedure
will be isomorphic to a mechanical proof of the theorem
corresponding to the program-assertion pair.
5) Present theorem provers are not convenient to use because
of the low level of predicate calculus, making it difficult
to describe even simple data structures. A new high level
description and axioms are required.
6) Programs must be properly partitioned in order to
prevent the overflowing of variables from module to
module and thus making proofs extremely difficult.
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7) Automatic program verification procedures are more
likely to be more easily carried out - and are of more
practical interest - for programs characterized by
large numbers of simple operations.
Thus there is much to be done in the development of the techniques
required for automatic program validation and verification. For
systems that are currently under development, improvements and
increased testing are being applied in order to develop programs
that are as correct and as reliable as possible. As an example of
the methods currently being , a brief description of the techniques
being used by Bell Labs is presented. The procedure presented is
being applied by the large development group that is working on the
computer software for the SAFEGUARD project. The material was
contained in a letter from T. Crowley, [Ref. 5], the Executive
Director of the SAFEGUARD Design Division.
1) An extensive system of documentation including manuals,
specifications, program documentation, etc., exists.
2) An advanced and flexible high-level programming language
(CENTRAN) is used.
3) The techniques of Structured Programming, which involve
GOTO-free, modular code are being applied. This causes
the code to be more readable and thus simpler to maintain,
as well as providing for more efficient testing.
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4) Programmer Notes is a special document by which
programmers can quickly and informally keep others on
the project informed of new methods and ideas.
5) Program language reference cards, covering the major
languages used on the project, provide for quick and easy
reference to the information that is most needed by
programmers.
6) An extensive training program for project members
encompasses both hardware and software subjects.
7) Periodic design reviews throughout the software life
cycle are used to make visible the requirements,
specifications, design, and test and integration plans
for constructive comment and critique.
8) Quality assurance checks on both documentation and
listings are performed.
Programs are first coded, compiled, and then extensively unit-
tested. The related programs are integrated with one another, and
again completely tested by groups of programmers other than those
who first worked on the modules. After the modules are integrated
and checked out, a System Readiness Verification system which con-
tains a System Exerciser, is used to thoroughly test the system as a
whole. Testing is first done at a test site using prototype equipment,




A special group is responsible for controlling all "frozen"
programs. They maintain the official files and make any changes
that are required. There is an extensive change management system
to handle trouble reports and corrective reports which this group
supervises. This is to ensure that all groups working on a module
in the frozen segment have the same copy to work with. Important
procedures for all steps are specified in the SAFEGUARD Policies,
Procedures, and Standards Manual. This assures that all personnel
on the project are working towards the same goals with the same
tools.
Bell Labs is thus applying all available tools in order to provide
a state-of-the-art computer program to run a state-of-the-art
hardware system. Each of the areas outlined for ensuring program
validation and reliability have been covered by Bell Labs in this
production effort. The one class of errors that has not been covered
in this presentation is errors that occur after the program is resident
in the computer, and that is the subject of the next chapter.
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V. FAULT DETECTION AND CORRECTION
IN COMPUTER PROGRAMS
This area of computer faults and failures has received the least
amount of attention until very recently as it is hard to detect this type
of error in systems which have either low reliable hardware or
improperly debugged software. It is only with recent developments
that this type of failure begins to show up.
A major problem with fleet tactical programs is the failures that
occur because of computer program faults. The situation is such that
the most common cause of system failure is the compviter program.
While researching this problem talks and discussions were held with
representatives of RCA, Raytheon, NAVORD, and UNIVAC while work-
ing with the AEGIS TECHREP office at Moorestown, New Jersey. The
discussions established three areas that must be approached in order
to insure the high reliability and availability of computer programs
required in the Fleet. The first, during the design and development
stage, has been previously presented. The next two areas are fault
prevention and fault detection/correction after the operational programs
have been placed aboard ship.
Having followed the techniques of good design, documentation, and
debugging, the program master tapes that are sent to the Fleet must
be assumed to be without errors. Some standard methods to insure
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that mechanical faults do not enter the system should be followed.
The master tapes should not be loaded to maximum density and a slow
tape speed should be used. This will reduce the possibility of load
errors and access errors from the tape. In addition the master tapes
should be periodically checked and replaced if they show any signs of
wear.. While the tapes are being loaded into core and onto disc, there
are several checks that should be made to see if any faults are occur-
ring during the loading process. Parity checks on each word as it is
loaded and checksums on each module will give assurance that each
word and the entire module had been loaded correctly. The mechanical
checks and safety precautions coupled with the program checksum and
parity checks would assure that the program has been successful in
moving in correct form from cards to tape into the computer. Prior to
the loading of the program into the computer, the computer diagnostic
programs should be run on all computers in the system to insure that
they are in correct mechanical condition. Starting with the hardware
in an "up" status, the correct programs, and using proper loading
techniques, will reduce to a minimum the number of errors that the
detection system will have to find that are not caused by the operating
system. This leads to the last area of concern, and the most important:
The detection of and correction of system errors that are caused by




Fault detection in computer programs must satisfy two major
requirements in order to be successful. It must work with a coverage
approaching 100%, and it must not be excessive in the use of main
processor time and core memory. The two categories that the checks
fall into are core checks and operability checks. In addition, the two
main causes of errors in computer programs are: 1) a transient occurs
during the read/write cycle of the computer, and an improper word is
written back into core; 2) a transient occurs while data is being passed
around the computer from one module to another and an improbable
action results. To counter the first of these problems there are
several procedures that the executive writer should allow for. When-
ever a module is loaded into the computer, both parity and checksums
should be checked on the module. In addition, on a continuing and
random basis, the checksum analysis should be made on those modules
that are resident and non-changing in core. Also on a continuing and
random basis, all of the instructions in core should be checked to
insure that they are legal instructions for the computer. To catch
these errors on an operational level, some of the program acceptance
tests, suitably modified, can be run to see if the correct results are
obtained for the specific inputs and tests used [Ref. 5]. The online
programs for hardware fault detection in the computer should also be
run. This would lead to the detection of any faults that could cause
transients and affect the quality of the program in core.
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The second area where program errors can occur is faults in
module operations caused by transients effecting data flow. These
faults are detectable in several ways, two of them inherent to the
computer. If there is an overflow resulting from any form of math-
ematical operation, a machine interrupt is generated. Aninterrupt
is also generated if a module attempts to address a region of core
beyond its legal limits. The information that these errors occurred
must go to the interrupt handling routines [Ref. 5], These routines
will determine what steps must be taken to recover from the errors
generated. Other types of detection that must be implemented include
the use of:
1) Arithmetic accuracy--a check to be sure that the arith-
metic logic of the computer is operating correctly.
2) Reasonableness checks --to insure that the values coming
into the modules are reasonable and that the results of any
operations performed are also reasonable.
3) Reasonable execution time--checks to insure that the
module completes its assigned task in the amount of time
allotted to it.
Once an error of any type is detected, the problem of what is to be
done can be solved in three ways.
An error that occurs because of improper data transfer and is
detected by an interrupt will be overcome by re-initiating the request
for the data needed and reentering the affected module. If the error
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re-occurs, or if it is an addressing or instruction error as determined
by any ofthe above checks, then the module that is bad should be re-
loaded by itself if this is possible (dynamic reloading), re-initialized,
and the operation continued as before (program rollback). Should the
module be one of a complex group such that it cannot be dynamically
reloaded, then the fact that this module is down must be made known
to: the operator, and the system must be automatically re-configured
so as not to use this module.
The problem is how to implement these detection and repair
processes, and several possible techniques that may be used are
presented in the following paragraphs.
Parity checks should be used to check each word as it is passed
into core memory from disc. As long as analysis indicates that most
errors are single bit errors, then parity checks will detect all faults.
The problem with the use of parity is the high amount of redundancy
required in order to gain a high level of confidence in the results.
James Martin [Ref. 1] discusses different aspects and applications of
parity checks, with the conclusion that it must be used in conjunction
with other detection methods to obtain the coverage that is desired.
Also discussed are polynomial codes that can be used for the verifica-
tion of input data to the system or from module to module. This use
for: polynomial codes is presently being used by several manufacturers
for the verification of disc storage. Considering the types of errors
anticipated, this would prove to be a very effective procedure to
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implement. However, the present complexity of conducting software
polynomial checks would lead to extensive use of machine time, or
require the building of special purpose hardware to do the checking.
The tradeoff of polynomial checks by special hardware, and parity
checks plus additional detection methods must be made on a system
by system basis.
The use of checksums to detect errors requires that the modules
be produced with this in mind starting with the first design step.
The sections of the module that are non-changing must be separated
from the data sections so that checksums can be applied effectively.
This will require additional coding, but is a very effective method of
determining if a module had been changed either while being read into
core or while standing in core waiting to be used. Checksum methods
can be applied to operation codes and to the address portions of
instructions and data accesses, being limited only by the amount of
main processor time that can be dedicated to these checks.
Data reasonableness and data consistency checks must be made
on all inputs to the individual modules. As part of the executive
program, all data that is received into the system and all data that
iff passed from one module to another should be checked against
predetermined limits. If the limits are exceeded, then the data
should be discarded, and attempts made to acquire new data [Ref. 5].
If this attempt fails, then the system must be reconfigured to avoid
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using the faulty data and the module that is presenting it. These checks
would also reject information coming in a sequence that is not in line
with what is expected by the executive program.
Periodic checks, though less frequent than either parity or check-
sums, must be run to compare the copies of the modules in core with
the copies that exist in reference storage [Ref. 9]. Again this is to
verify that the unused version has not been changed while standing-by
in core. Checks must also be made of the reference and it must be
replaced as required by wear.
Detection of timeouts, message code errors, clock errors, and
hardware parameter errors that do not result in detectable hardware
errors (by generating interrupts), must be detected by the executive
program (by observing performance). These are the types of transient
faults that can change the quality of the program in core without affect-
ing the hardware sensors. Attention from the start of the programming
project is required to be sure that this additional coding is included as
part of the computer programs.
The methods that are outlined above are applicable to any computer
and machine language that is currently in use today. They must be
anticipated and required during the initial design stages as part of the
specifications of the computer system. The next big leap ahead in the
detection of errors will be in the modification of machine languages to
facilitate the detection and correction of faults. Although not as yet
applicable, a possible method of implementation is described below.
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The purpose of this method of machine coding would be to give as
much separation as possible to the most commonly used operation
codes. In addition it would separate all op codes by a minimum of
two bits changes from one another. This would allow the detection of
all illegal operation codes (under the assumption that transient errors
would normally affect only one bit at a time) and permit the executive
program to address a correct copy of the module and correct the
error. In addition, multiple bit errors would be indicated by the
quantity and types of instructions occurring. If an instruction is seen
to be occurring at unreasonable rates, the executive program could
again check the module against the reference copy and locate and
correct any errors.
As a simple example consider a machine that has only four
instructions, and uses three bits to implement these instructions in
machine code. The instructions used are read, write, store, and add,
Assuming the read and write are the most common to occur, they
would get the most separation, with minimum separation being two
bit changes between any instruction. Figure 2 shows the separation
possible using a cube to represent the eight possible codes using
three bits. The implementation of this type of checking would require













Although this method of operation code error detection is highly
redundant in its coding, for systems that require extreme accuracy
and high percentage fault detection, it provides 100% detection of
single faults and gives an excellent indication of double faults through
the use of expected execution frequency for the different operation
codes.
The specific code chosen avoids using 000 as a legal code. When
core for a program is allotted and data and instructions inserted, 000
is a very common core constant or leader on a data word. Avoiding
its use as an opcode provides for more protection and safety from
confusion when making operation code validity checks. There is much
more work yet to be done before this can be applied to any operational
system. The basic requirement for the rewriting of the machine lan-
guage may prevent this procedure from being used until a new
computer and operating system is designed.
The techniques described (parity, checksum, operation code
spreading) all have one detail in common. They all make use of
redundancy in coding to accomplish their checks. As redundancy has
had to be applied to hardware to make it reliable, so must redundancy
be applied to the computer programs in a system. The balance that
is being searched for is one that provides the required availability
without using excessive (expensive, time consuming) redundancy. As
systems become larger, more work must be done to insure that the
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system is made effective and reliable by the proper balance of redun-
dancy techniques against performance requirements.
As; an up to date example of what is being done along these lines,
the. SAFEGUARD system is again discussed.
The system provides effective error detection and response
features within the operating system and the tactical programs. The
purpose of this code is to detect errors, isolate the cause, confine
the error effect, continue the program operation, and notify the
system operators of the faults. Some of the error control features
are:
1) A Maintenance and Diagnostic dystem provides for the
automatic detection of hardware faults using an off-line
support computer.
2.) Detection of timeouts, data parity errors, message code
errors, illegal operation codes, clock errors, and limit
sensing errors are built into the hardware and are dealt
with by software or by the operator as appropriate.
3) A program known as the Process Coordinator attempts to
isolate the detected fault to a replaceable rack or software
function and maintains maximum capability by restart or
reconfiguration.




5) Defensive programming techniques are used throughout-
-
--special code is incorporated into the modules to maintain
sanity in case they are interrupted for exceeding their time
limit
_- when errors are encountered, unreliable data flags are
set to keep succeeding modules from using bad data
--data reasonableness checks are used extensively to
test if data are within pre-established bounds.
6) Audits on critical data sets are embedded in code as
required, Audit Programs, written to check global data
sets for consistency, can detect certain types of error
occurrences which may otherwise remain undetected until
the potential impact is critical.
The SAFEGUARD System thus employs many of the new techniques
that are just being developed in order to obtain the reliability needed




Many techniques have been described that can be used to make
computer systems reliable and available. The prime consideration
that has to be made is what level of performance is required of the
system based on the tactical usage. If it is to be used where the
correct result is of prime need, then speed can be sacrificed for the
installation of all of the fault detection and correction devices described.
On the other hand, if some type of operation, even in a degraded mode,
is- needed, then some of these devices can be left out in exchange for
a very large, automatic system reconfigurer. No single statement of
purpose can be made about which method is the best. The tactical
requirements must be evaluated, and the amount of time, money and
machine space available for fault detection and correction devices
examined to determine which methods are to be used.
More time must be spent gathering data on the present Navy
systems to see in which area the errors are occurring, what steps
must be taken to correct the errors, and which methods are the most
feasible to apply to current systems. No effective information is
being gathered at present, so that any conclusions drawn about the
current systems would not reflect accurately upon the situation.
NEL.C is currently conducting research in this area [Ref. 19], and
will soon have information concerning the ability to predict the
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availability of tactical programs. To the knowledge of the writer,
there are no programs underway investigating the need for on-line
fault detection in the system computer programs. As stated before,
the programs and the hardware are becoming more and more reliable,
and the big problem of transient faults causing errors must be
investigated to keep tactical programs running reliably with the
required availability.
Future research and development work must be conducted in all
areas of computer program development. The many computer soci-
eties now in existence are beginning to devote more attention to fault-
tolerant software and systems. The Navy as a whole is lagging in
this area. In particular, the need exists for the establishment of both
general and particular specifications and standards for computer
programs. Just as reliability and maintainability requirements are
placed on the hardware of a system, so must they be outlined for the
system software. The developers would then know what is expected
of them, and different procurement efforts wotild conform with each
other.
Programs must be instituted to gather data on the exact causes
of failures to enable programmers to determine whether the failures
occur because of improperly written programs or because of inter-
mittent hardware failures, or as contended in this thesis, by transient
and external abberations (hardware and software interaction).
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From the management point of view several new techniques are
under development and are coming into use. They include the "thread"
concept [Ref. 20] of program organization as used by CSC on the
AEGIS project and the creation of special program control groups as
Bell Labs is doing with the SAFEGUARD program. Both of these sys-
tems appear promising and should be evaluated as the two projects
continue. Rather than attempting to do development in many separate
communities, the Navy should centralize the development effort to
save time, money and the duplication of effort.
Of even more interest is the development of the automated pro-
gram checkers and provers. Much work is being done in the civilian
community that warrants detailed investigation. The algorithms for
Navy tactical programs are of a type that is appropriate to this method
of proof-large quantities and many repetitions of basic mathematical
processes. Additional work is being done in the area of hardware
design. Larger and faster discs are being developed that, when
coupled with third generation computers and properly designed operat-
ing systems, will enable the use of extensive check programs without
loading down the central processor with data transfers. The "new"
developments in operating systems (multi-processing, shared
memories) must be used extensively as they permit massive recovery
and reconfiguration in tactical computer systems. These new develop-
ments will soon put present and planned operating systems out of date
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unless time is now devoted to planning for the next generation of
tactical systems.
The most important step that has to be taken with present tactical
systems is in the information gathering area. Before any of the new
practices and developments can be applied to these systems, an actual
measure of their current performance and problems must be gathered.
Funds must be made available so that failure- information from opera-
tional systems can be gathered and analyzed. There are monitors
and measuring systems currently available that would provide some
of this needed information. Software and hardware devices for the
Navy's specific systems must be developed and distributed to the
operating ships. Once it is determined where the errors are coming
from, then the techniques outlined in the previous chapters can be
used as required to "failureproof" new operational systems by making
them selfcontained in the fault detection and correction field.
This thesis has presented and developed some of the newer problem
areas in tactical computer systems that are facing the fleet today.
The developments that are taking place, the new practices that are
state-of-the-art, and some possible new approaches have been outlined.
There is a large gap between what exists and what can be done and
what should be done. Tt is in this gap that future research, using some
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A major problem with present fleet tactical computer programs is the
failures that occur because of software faults caused by intermittent transient
errors. Presented are measures that should be taken to prevent the generation
of these transients, and possible steps for the detection and the correction of
faults caused by these transients. Examples are drawn from the practices
used in the SAFEGUARD, AEGIS, and STAR computer system programs.
The paper describes some of the causes of program degradation and
requirements for future activities to overcome these problems. Some
specific examples are shown to illustrate corrective measures that could
be taken. The applicability of protective redundancy to computer programs
is established.
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